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Abstract
If and when sustained human-to-human transmission of H5N1 becomes a reality, the world will no
longer be dealing with sporadic avian flu borne along migratory flight paths of birds, but aviation flu
– winged at subsonic speed along commercial air conduits to every corner of planet Earth. Given
that air transportation is the one feature that most differentiates present day transmission
scenarios from those in 1918, our present inability to prevent spread of influenza by international
air travel, as reckoned by the World Health Organization, constitutes a major weakness in the
current global preparedness plan against pandemic flu. Despite the lessons of SARS, it is surprising
that aviation-related health policy options have not been more rigorously evaluated, or scientific
research aimed at strengthening public health measures on the air transportation front, more
energetically pursued.
Background
Air transportation has undoubtedly been a boon to
humankind – bringing together peoples, cultures and val-
ues, and profoundly changing the way we live. But it has
also greatly aided the global transmission of infectious
disease. In the old days, geographical distance provided a
measure of protection as signs and symptoms had time to
develop and those afflicted could be screened at border
entry points. Today, with hardly an airport unreachable
within 36 hours from any point on our planet, the speed
– and pattern – of microbial movements has altered dra-
matically.
In 1992, the Institute of Medicine report Emerging Infec-
tions: Microbial Threats to Health in the United States cor-
rectly identified "microbial adaptation and change" and
"expanding international travel and commerce" as two of
the major factors contributing to disease emergence and
re-emergence [1]. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS), in retrospect, epitomized this new model of dis-
ease outbreak. The previously unrecognized SARS-CoV
coronavirus mysteriously surfaced in Guangdong Prov-
ince, China, in November 2002, simmered there for three
months, and arrived in Hong Kong on a jet plane. From
that busy aviation hub, it quickly spread to Vietnam, Sin-
gapore, and Canada, eventually afflicting 27 countries and
taking 813 lives [2].
Learning from SARS
Thankfully, SARS did not progress to a full-blown pan-
demic as was widely feared. For reasons that are still
unclear, the disease fizzled out, leaving us unsure as to
whether we licked it or were just plain lucky. With avian
flu now on everybody's mind, it is worth recalling the
grim images of those dark days not so long ago – when
some of the busiest airports in the world lay deserted as
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panic-stricken, would-be travelers stayed home. Anxious
aircrew clamored for adequate protection at work [3]
while medical and airline industry officials rejected the
notion that the virus could be transmitted on airplanes –
until the World Health Organization (WHO) weighed in
to say that travelers seated within two rows of an infected
person could be in danger. We now know that passengers
sitting eight rows away are not any safer, and that out of a
total of 40 commercial air flights investigated for carrying
SARS infected passengers, five have been found to be asso-
ciated with probable onboard transmission of SARS,
involving 37 passengers in all [4].
The first in-flight transmission of SARS occurred in a
female flight attendant who caught it from a family of
three Singaporeans incubating the virus on a Singapore
Airlines flight between New York and Frankfurt on 14
March 2003 [5]. Soon after, more cases were reported,
such as when a cluster of thirteen passengers from Hong
Kong was infected during an Air China Flight to Beijing on
15 March 2003, with a 72 year fellow passenger believed
to be the source [6]. Then there was the pandemonium
which broke when a certain 48-year-old man with symp-
toms of SARS was discovered to have flown on Lufthansa
from Hong Kong to Munich, Barcelona, Frankfurt, Lon-
don, Munich again, Frankfurt again, and back to Hong
Kong before entering a hospital on his own accord. On 10
April 2003, the Hong Kong Department of Health had to
desperately appeal for passengers and aircrew from all
seven flights to consult their doctors [5].
As the fear of SARS became more contagious than the con-
tagion itself, stock markets tumbled and billions of dol-
lars were lost. Coming close at the heels of 9/11 and the
Iraq war, SARS dashed hopes of recovery for the ailing air-
line industry. The latter is understandably not saying very
much these days about any avian flu contingency plans
they might have; one certainly hopes that appropriate pre-
ventive measures are being put into place. But that may be
just the problem: What is the evidential base for effective
public health interventions in the aviation industry, and
how rigorously have the relevant aviation policy options
been evaluated in the intervening years since the SARS epi-
sode [7]?
Did we really learn?
Take thermal scanners for instance – first deployed in Sin-
gapore's Changi Airport and enthusiastically adopted by
other "high-risk" airports around the world, in answer to
the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO)
call for mass-screening of arriving and departing passen-
gers and crews for raised temperature [8]. It was an inno-
vative application of military technology to address an
urgent need. To date, however, we are none the wiser
regarding the sensitivity, specificity, or cost effectiveness
of this screening tool for SARS, much less its usefulness for
influenza. About all we know is that Canadian officials
reportedly screened 1 million passengers with thermal
scanners at an estimated cost of Can$7.55 million, with-
out detecting a single case of SARS [9,10].
No one knows for sure what preventive measures all air-
lines and airports of the world should uniformly adopt in
order to mitigate the spread of infectious diseases by air.
The WHO's global influenza preparedness plan merely
acknowledges, without elaboration, that "air travel might
hasten the spread of a new virus, and decrease the time
available for preparing interventions" [11] while ICAO's
current website repeats the same general measures that it
had posted for SARS [12]. With the threat of an influenza
pandemic looming, which by all accounts will make SARS
pale in comparison, all we have to go by today is the same
generic advice on hand washing and personal hygiene for
airline workers, and a negative assurance of sorts from the
US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
that "there is no evidence that avian influenza is spread
through contact with baggage, packages, or other
objects..." [13].
Neglected front?
Apart from the desperate culling of affected poultry, much
of the current global preparatory activities against avian
flu pandemic revolve around surveillance, diagnostics,
hospital infection control, vaccines production, and
stockpile of antiviral agents. These efforts are necessary
and laudable, but might they not also reflect the "medi-
cal" bias of existing paradigms? The SARS episode had
highlighted the importance of enlisting travel industry
workers and travelers as frontline fighters in the global
response. If and when sustained human-to-human trans-
mission of H5N1 becomes a reality, the world will no
longer be dealing with sporadic avian flu borne along
migratory flight paths of birds [14,15] but aviation flu –
winged at subsonic speed along commercial air conduits
to every corner of planet Earth. Surely any global battle
plan against pandemic flu should entertain the notion of
stopping the enemy at the gates, or along the corridors of
its advance, before it reaches our homes, hospitals and
clinics?
Alas, the 2005 WHO report Avian influenza: assessing the
pandemic has dismally concluded that "If only a few coun-
tries are affected, travel-related measures, such as exit
screening for persons departing from affected areas, might
delay international spread somewhat, but cannot stop it.
When large numbers of cases occur ... entry screening at
airports and borders will have no impact" [16]. Granted,
if a substantial portion of transmission occurs during the
incubation or asymptomatic phase of disease, entry
screening is unlikely to be effective in preventing or delay-Health Research Policy and Systems 2006, 4:8 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/4/1/8
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ing an epidemic resulting from the importation of influ-
enza [17]; and granted, the short time lag for scrambling
upon discovery of a sentinel case will pose serious chal-
lenges to effective quarantine and contact tracing meas-
ures; but are we acquiescing on this critical front too
readily?
What must we do?
Sensible actions depend on knowing precisely what is
going on, which in turn depends on good quality data.
The fact of the matter is, we have simply not invested
enough in the kind of multidisciplinary research needed,
involving epidemiology [18], mathematical modeling
[19], computational simulation [20], electronic tracking
[21], and biological detection technology [22], to name a
few, to elucidate the dynamics of microbial transmission
associated with air travel, be it in aircraft cabins, toilets, or
transit lounges. Four years after SARS, and we are no
clearer regarding the complex spatial interactions of trave-
lers converging on busy air terminals; or how best such
human traffic may be channeled to minimize the risk of
viral transmission; or what impact stringent screening
impositions would have on passenger reaction and behav-
ior. If the economic and wider arguments for maintaining
continuity of air traffic flow (without which many nations
could find their ability to keep going during a pandemic
severely impaired) are not well researched and under-
stood beforehand, arbitrary and capricious actions such as
panic closure of borders, possibly leading to an abrupt
global shut-down, could well result.
The current view is that under most scenarios, restrictions
on air travel are likely to be of little value in delaying the
proliferation of epidemics, unless almost all travel ceases
very soon after epidemics are detected [23]. But if the tech-
nology for picking out passengers capable of transmitting
deadly pathogens and setting off killer epidemics does not
exist today, should we not be pursuing it as energetically
as we do, the technology for stopping terrorists from
boarding a plane? Against a conservatively estimated
US$800 billion a year that a human pandemic of avian
influenza could cost the global economy [24], not to men-
tion the incalculable cost in terms of human lives [25], it
seems incredible that the aviation lessons of SARS have
not led to an acceleration of scientific research and health
policy evaluation aimed at strengthening public health
defenses on the air transportation front.
Conclusion
To put things in perspective, we are engaged in a millen-
nia-old, interspecies struggle between man and microbes.
While the unseen enemy thrives because of its capacity for
relentless adaptation and opportunistic spread, our own
record of survival and progress owes much to the fact that
at every critical turn, we have somehow managed to ask
the right questions and looked hard enough at the right
places for the right answers – be it in quarantine and vac-
cination strategies or an armamentarium of antibiotics
and antiviral agents. In the coming epic battle against pan-
demic flu, the stakes have never been higher. If our strate-
gies (read: health policies) are to work, they must be
reliably informed by accurate intelligence (read: health
research) which must cover all bases. Given that interna-
tional air travel is the one feature that most differentiates
present day transmission scenarios from those in 1918, it
is surely relevant to ask, just how flu-ready are the airlines
and airports of the world?
The call is for more scientific research devoted to this crit-
ical front. Two aspects deserve particular attention: (a) the
science of transmission of infection between individuals
and nations via air transportation and (b) the rigorous
examination of policy options, based on the evidence and
taking into consideration the economic trade-offs
required. Resolving the tension between these aspects
(and between the concerns of doomsday modelers and
real-world policy makers in government, world health
and air transport organizations) will improve the confus-
ing impasse we seem to be in at present.
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